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At present, the hierarchical predic-
tive coding framework does not yet make 
stringent commitments as to the nature of 
the causal models that the brain can rep-
resent. Hence, contrary to suggestions by 
Clark (in press), the framework does not yet 
have the virtue that it effectively implements 
tractable Bayesian inference. At this point 
in time three mutually exclusive options 
remain open: either predictive coding does 
not implement Bayesian inference, or pre-
dictive coding is not tractable, or the theory 
of hierarchical predictive coding is enriched 
by specific assumptions about the structure 
of the brain’s causal models.
Assuming that one is committed to the 
Bayesian Brain Hypothesis, the first two 
options are out and the third is the only 
one remaining. Formal analyses expanding 
on this option are beyond the scope of this 
commentary (see e.g., Blokpoel et al., 2010; 
van Rooij et al., 2011), but Table 1 qualita-
tively sketches the space of causal models that 
could (or could not) yield tractable Bayesian 
cause estimation. We will discuss the viability 
of the options in more detail below.
To start, causal models could be assumed 
to be quite simple, e.g., having high degrees 
of statistical independencies of variables. 
In this case, it may be that heuristic meth-
ods, such as those based on gradient ascent 
(Friston, 2002, p. 13) or a Kalman filter (Rao 
It is thus a major virtue of the hierarchical 
predictive coding account that it effectively 
implements a computationally tractable 
version of the so-called Bayesian Brain 
Hypothesis. (Clark, in press)
It seems by now common wisdom that a 
brain organized according to the principles of 
hierarchical predictive coding is a brain that is 
capable of efficiently performing full-blown 
Bayesian inferences. The idea is not only com-
mon, but also of great significance, as it sug-
gests that the hierarchical predictive coding 
framework may provide a neurally plausible 
and computationally feasible bridge between 
theories of neural functioning (Friston, 2005) 
and theories of cognitive functioning (Chater 
and Manning, 2006; Baker et al., 2009).
But can predictive brains really be the 
same as Bayesian brains? Or is the claim 
merely an informal or imprecise shorthand 
for something which is formally and fac-
tually false? We address these questions by 
reconsidering the formal specifications of 
the theory of hierarchical predictive coding, 
as put forth by Friston (2002, 2005).
In the hierarchical predictive coding 
framework, it is assumed that the brain 
represents the statistical structure of the 
world at different levels of abstraction by 
maintaining different causal models that 
are organized on different levels of a hier-
archy, where each level obtains input from 
its subordinate level. In a feed-backward 
chain, predictions are made for the level 
below. The error between the model’s 
predicted input and the observed (for 
the lowest level) or inferred (for higher 
levels) input at that level is used (a) in a 
feed-forward chain to estimate the causes 
at the level above and (b) to reconfigure 
the causal models for future predictions. 
Ultimately, the system stabilizes when it 
has minimized the overall prediction error.
Here we will focus on (a) the cause 
estimation step in the feed-forward 
chain. We will argue that the predictive 
coding framework does not yet satisfac-
torily specify how this step can be both 
Bayesian and computationally tractable. 
In the Bayesian interpretation of predic-
tive coding (Friston, 2002) estimating the 
causes comes down to finding the most 
probable causes vm given the input u for 
that level and the current model param-
eters θ:
 v v um v= | ;argmax Pr( )θ
Given that vm has maximum a posteriori 
probability (MAP), the idea that predictive 
coding implements Bayesian inference seems 
to hinge on this step. The idea that hierar-
chical predictive coding implements tracta-
ble Bayesian inference in turn hinges on the 
presumed existence of a tractable computa-
tional method for estimating vm. Given that 
it is known that computing MAP—whether 
exactly or approximately—is computation-
ally intractable for arbitrary causal structures 
(Shimony, 1994; Abdelbar and Hedetniemi, 
1998; Kwisthout, 2011), the existence of a trac-
table method crucially depends on the struc-
tural properties of the brain’s causal models 
(Kwisthout et al., 2011).1
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1We note that, for arbitrary causal structures, having 
the prediction and the prediction error in the input 
when estimating vm does not make this estimation 
computationally tractable.
Table 1 | For which types of causal models do there exist methods for cause estimation that are 
both tractable and Bayesian?
Structure of causal Method used for Bayesian  Tractable 
models cause estimation
Simple Heuristic Yes Yes
 Approximate Yes Yes
Intermediate Heuristic Maybe Yes
 Approximate Yes Maybe
Unconstrained  Heuristic No Yes
 Approximate Yes No
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that the brain has evolved specifically those 
constraints on its causal models that afford 
tractable Bayesian inference via  hierarchical 
predictive coding. The open question 
remaining is what those constraints could 
possibly be. This question is particularly 
pressing, yet non-trivial to answer, if the 
hierarchical predictive coding account 
aims to apply to all levels of perception 
and cognition.
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and Ballard, 1999), yield tractable Bayesian 
cause estimation. Let’s assume that it does. 
Then, of course, also tractable approxima-
tion methods exist for those simple struc-
tures—the heuristics themselves being a 
case in point. Note, however, that a com-
mitment to such simple causal models 
may limit the scope of the predictive cod-
ing theory to simple or low-level forms of 
perception and cognition. After all, higher-
order causal reasoning—such as occurs, for 
instance, in Theory of Mind (Kilner et al., 
2007)—seems to presuppose quite sophis-
ticated causal structures containing complex 
statistical interdependencies (see Figure 1 
for an illustration; cf. Uithol et al., 2011). 
Complex causal models can allow for rugged 
probability landscapes of different possible 
causes and heuristic methods can get stuck 
in local optima that may be arbitrarily far off 
from the true Bayesian (i.e., MAP) solution. 
For complex causal structures, heuristics are 
thus not guaranteed to do anything remotely 
like approximating Bayesian inference.
Given that the hierarchical predictive 
coding framework seems to aspire span-
ning all levels of cognitive functioning, it 
probably does not want to commit to sim-
ple causal models. The other extreme—i.e., 
that the brain’s causal models are structur-
ally unconstrained—is also excluded. As 
explained above, it follows from known 
intractability results for approximat-
ing MAP (Shimony, 1994; Abdelbar and 
Hedetniemi, 1998; Kwisthout, 2011) that 
such a brain cannot implement tractable 
Bayesian inference. We are thus left with 
the intermediate option: The causal models 
represented by the brain can be complex 
but not arbitrarily so. Given that the exact 
nature of this causal complexity will deter-
mine whether or not a hierarchical predic-
tive coding architecture can implement 
tractable Bayesian inference, it seems vital 
for the viability of the marriage between 
the predictive coding framework and the 
Bayesian Brain Hypothesis to identify 
exactly what this nature is.
There is a strong appeal to the Bayesian 
Brain Hypothesis, as well as to the hypoth-
esis that the brain implements cognition 
via hierarchical predictive coding. Given 
that the statistics of the world do not seem 
to be arbitrarily complex, it is conceivable 
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Figure 1 | An illustration of a hierarchy with higher level complex causal 
models. The illustration builds on the Jekyll and Hyde example used by Kilner 
et al. (2007). Kilner et al. assumed four different levels and simple mappings 
between the levels. For example, if at the higher level one infers that the 
person grasping the scalpel is Dr. Jekyll (or Mr. Hyde) then at the lower level 
one predicts the intention is to heal (or to hurt). The Figure illustrates that at 
higher levels of the hierarchy the causal models within a level can become 
quite complex. Whether one infers that the person is Jekyll or Hyde can 
depend on a myriad of interconnected variables, such as the present  
location, the health status of the patient, the weather, and the person’s  
mood. Note that this complexity cannot be dissolved by decomposing the 
complex causal model into simple causal models at higher levels of the 
hierarchy, because complex models cannot generally be so decomposed. So 
it seems that if one wants to use the hierarchical predictive coding framework 
to explain high-level cognition, then complex models within levels are  
required.
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